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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Did the Court of Appeals fail to follow the 
applicable standard of review following a trial court's granting a 
motion for a directed verdict. 
B. Did the Court of Appeals improperly weigh evidence 
presented before the trial court to resolve a factual dispute 
against the party who the trial court directed the verdict against, 
C. Did the Court of Appeals fail to properly address 
applicability of "offensive" use of the Utah Good Samaritan Act, 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-11-22, relating to potential comparative 
negligence of a "good Samaritan" in causing her own injuries. 
REFERENCE TO THE OPINION OP THE COURT OP APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision 
(not for official publication) affirming the trial court's granting 
a directed verdict. A subsequent amended memorandum decision was 
also filed by the Court of Appeals, though the substance of the 
memorandum decision did not change. The Court of Appeal's 
memorandum decisions constitute grounds for this petition for writ 
of certiorari for review of the decision by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Complete copies of these decisions, and all other procedural and 
substantive rulings by the Utah Court of Appeals are attached in 
the Appendix herewith. 
JURISDICTION OP THE SUPREME COURT 
A. Petitioner seeks certiorari review of the final 
amended memorandum decision of the Utah Court of Appeals dated and 
filed December 5, 1996. 
B. Prior to the Court of Appeal's issuance of its 
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amended memorandum decision dated December 5, 1996, the Court of 
Appeals had previously issued a memorandum decision which was filed 
on November 21, 1996. A petition for rehearing, following the 
original memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals, was filed on 
behalf of Petitioners on December 5, 1996, the same day that the 
Utah Court of Appeals filed its amended memorandum decision. The 
Utah Court of Appeals entered an order denying the Petition for re-
hearing on December 11, 1996. 
C. Reliance on Rule 47(c), not applicable. 
D. The Utah Supreme Court originally had jurisdiction 
of the appeal of a final judgment on a directed verdict by a 
district court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(3)(j). 
Jurisdiction was then transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4). After transfer of the 
matter to the Utah Court of Appeals, jurisdiction was vested there 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (j) . Jurisdiction now 
vests with the Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-
2-2(3)(a), in that Petitioner seeks appellate review of a judgment 
of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
GOVERNING STATUTES, COURT RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 50(a).Motion for a directed 
verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A 
party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence 
offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that the 
motion is not granted, without having reserved the right so to do 
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and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. A motion 
for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of 
trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for 
directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the 
specific ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting a 
motion for a directed verdict is effective without any assent of 
the jury. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-11-22. Good Samaritan Act. 
A person who renders emergency care at or near the scene 
of, or during an emergency, gratuitously and in good faith, is not 
liable for any civil damages or penalties as a result of any act or 
omission by the person rendering the emergency care, unless the 
person is grossly negligent or caused the emergency. As used in 
this section, "emergency" means an unexpected occurrence involving 
injury, threat of injury, or illness to a person or the public, 
including motor vehicle accidents, disasters, actual or threatened 
discharges, removal, or disposal of hazardous materials, and other 
accidents or events of a similar nature. "Emergency care" includes 
actual assistance or advice offered to avoid, mitigate, or attempt 
to mitigate the effects of an emergency. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this matter the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court's granting of a motion for directed verdict against 
plaintiff Maynarich. 
Defendant/Appellee Albert Bovier (hereinafter landlord 
Bovier) owned residential property which he leased to Stephanie 
3 
Dunlap. The property was located in the foothills in Price, Carbon 
County, Utah. Trial transcript, Volume 1, pp. 4, 84, 135, 139 
(R.800, 880, 931, 935). 
On at least one occasion, in 1989, prior to the time that 
landlord Bovier leased the property to Dunlap, run-off rain water 
came onto the property, covered the northwest corner with mud and 
silt and flooded the basement of the home. In an effort to 
mitigate the effect of run-off water coming onto the property, 
landlord Bovier had a retaining wall constructed on the rear of the 
property, the construction being ongoing and under contract at the 
time the lease was entered into between landlord Bovier and Dunlap. 
Trial transcript, Volume 1, pp. 7, 54-60, 62-70, 84-85, 112-113, 
118, 121-123, 132 and 140 (R. 803, 850-856, 858-866, 880-881, 908-
909, 914, 917-919, 928 and 936). 
In the following year, 1990, after a summer storm, run-
off rain water accumulated behind the retaining wall, flowed around 
it and ran onto the leased property and again covered the northwest 
corner with mud and silt and flooded the basement of the home, 
which at that time was leased to Stephanie Dunlap. Defendant 
landlord Bovier undertook additional measures to correct and 
mitigate the problems of run-off water coming onto the property 
following this second flooding incident. Trial transcript, Volume 
1, pp. 94-97, 123, 126, 134, 149-151 (R. 890-893, 919, 922, 930, 
945-947). 
During the next year, 1991, defendant landlord Bovier 
undertook additional measures attempting to assure that the run-off 
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water and mud, even though it would come onto the property, would 
not flood the basement of the home and would be directed to the 
curb and gutter systems of the city. In order for the water, mud 
and silt to reach the curb and gutter system, it had to travel the 
entire western boundary of the property, several feet away from the 
driveway. Another thunder storm came September 7th and once again 
run-off water not only flooded the basement of the leased home but 
also flooded the entire western boundary of the residential 
property with mud. Debris and silt also essentially covered the 
drive way on the property, which lies near the western boundary. 
Trial transcript, Volume 1, pp. 96-106, 113 and 127 (R. 892-902, 
909 and 923). 
When Stephanie Dunlap discovered that the basement was 
again flooded, she began to clean out the basement. While she was 
hauling water and mud from the basement she saw her neighbor, 
Plaintiff/Appellant Barbara Maynarich (hereinafter visitor 
Maynarich), and engaged in a discussion over the adjoining fences 
between their properties. Trial transcript, Volume 1, pp. 107-109, 
151-152, 154-155 (R. 903-905, 947-948, 950-951). 
Plaintiff visitor Maynarich was an employee of the 
maintenance department of the College of Eastern Utah and had 
access to large wet dry vacuums through her employment. Though the 
parties dispute whether visitor Maynarich volunteered to come over 
to the property to see if the wet dry vac would work or whether she 
was invited by Stephanie Dunlap to come on the property, plaintiff 
visitor Maynarich did go onto the property owned by landlord Bovier 
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which had been leased to Dunlap. Trial transcript, Volume 1, pp. 
156-157, 172-173 and Volume 2 pp. 333-335 (R.952-953, 968-969, R. 
1129-1131). 
The trial testimony with regards to the status of 
Maynarich as being a "business visitor" or a "licensee" included the 
direct testimony of Maynarich as follows: 
Q. Did you have a conversation with Stephanie as 
you were outside? 
A. I did. 
Q. And would you describe in your words the 
conversation. 
A. Right about then she came over to the fence and 
her and I were talking. She was just telling me about 
her basement. 
I have access to equipment at the college because I 
work in the maintenance department. I have access to 
equipment and so I just told her that they had a wet and 
dry vac that might be helpful to her to use. 
* * * 
Q. And do you believe that Stephanie wanted you to 
see how bad it was? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you feel that you had any obligation to 
provide help to Stephanie? 
A. I mean, as far as being obligated, no, but I 
helped her because I knew her. She was a friend of mine. 
She had little children at the time, and before I got 
married four years ago I was divorced when I married. I 
know how hard it is to be a single parent, and I was 
trying to do what I could do to help her out. 
Q. How long did that conversation last over the 
fence? 
A. I'd say maybe five minutes. 
Q. And did you then go over to Stephanie's house? 
A. Yes. 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, Volume II, pp. 33 3, lines 13-25, 334 and 335 
lines 1-19. (R. 1129-1131). 
Tenant Dunlap's trial testimony Wcis essentially the same 
and proceeded as follows: 
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Q. When did you first see my client Barbara 
Maynarich on that day? 
A, As far as what time? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Approximately 6:30, 7 o'clock. 
Q. And how did you come to see her? 
A. Over the fence. She lives over here, and I was 
bringing the buckets out and we just kind of come 
together and was talking for a few minutes. She was in 
her front yard. I was coming out the basement door. 
Q. Okay. So she lived in the home next door? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was discussed in the conversation, if you 
recall? 
A. How messy the situation was and how much the 
rainstorm, how much rain came down. She offered — she 
asked me how much mud and water was in the basement. I 
said it was completely flooded all the way across. 
She says, "Well, I have access —" "I possibly have 
access to a wet/dry vac." She says, "Maybe you could use 
that, you know, if it would help clean up the carpet." 
* * * 
Q. I understand. You can go ahead and sit down. 
So did she come to your house? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why did she come? 
A. For two reasons. To see if there was — I 
didn't know if there was too much mud, because she asked 
if there was too much mud and I didn't know how much. 
She came over to see how much, because I didn't know 
anything about a wet-dry vac, and to see the flooded 
basement. 
Q. Did you invite her to come over? 
A. As the natural, "Barbara, would you come over 
to my house?" or — it was a mutual thing. She wanted 
to come and I wanted her to come. So if that's an 
invitation, then yeah, I guess. 
Q. And you, of course, were appreciative of the 
fact that she was going to try to help out with the 
wet/dry vac? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, how much time went by from when you had 
the conversation over the fence until you actually saw 
her? 
A. Not a whole lot. I'd say less than ten 
minutes. 
Q. And how did you come to see her? Let me 
rephrase the question. When did you first see Barbara? 
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A. I think she was either coming down the stairs 
to the basement or she was coming through the basement 
door. I don't remember which. 
Q. And again, the basement door, that's the walk-
out door from the basement, correct? 
A. Right. 
Q. And again, just to give the jurors a flavor for 
where that is, that's behind the garage and it's west of 
the actual house, correct? 
A. Correct. 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, Volume I, pp. 154, lines 18-25, 155, 156, 157 
lines 1-23. (R. 950-953). If it were a given that there was a 
dispute in the trial testimony as to the status of Maynarich as 
being a "business visitor" or a "licensee", it is certainly clear 
that there was at least some evidence upon which a reasonably 
minded jury could conclude that Maynarich was a "business visitor". 
That factual issue, i.e. whether Maynarich was a "business visitor" 
or "licensee" should have been resolved in favor of the non-moving 
party for purposes of the appeal of the directed verdict. 
Plaintiff visitor Maynarich went into the basement of the 
home and observed the flooding and concluded, along with others 
present, that there was too much mud and silt for a wet dry vacuum 
to work. She subsequently tended one of the young children of 
Stephanie Dunlap while Stephanie Dunlap and a friend continued 
cleaning the flood waters, mud, and silt from the basement. Trial 
transcript, Volume 1, pp. 157, 159-160, 171; Volume 2 pp. 335, 358-
362 (R. 953, 955-956, 967, R. 1131, 1154-1158). 
After a short time, plaintiff visitor Maynarich proceeded 
upstairs from the basement, outside and then walked close to the 
western boundary of the property (the same area which had been 
severely flooded, and covered with mud and silt) to return to her 
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home next door. As she stepped from the mud covered grass to the 
mud covered driveway she slipped and fell causing a bimalleolar 
fracture to her right ankle. Special damages from the injury 
amounted to at least $27,211.63 of past and future medical expenses 
and a wage loss of at least $1,600.00. Trial transcript, Volume 1, 
pp. 161-163; Volume 2 pp. 295, 337-338, 352, and 355 (R. 957-959; 
R. 1091, 1133-1134, 1148 and 1151). 
Immediately following plaintiff resting her case, without 
recess, Seventh District Court Judge Halliday heard and granted the 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Trial transcript, 
Volume 2, pp. 392-393 (R. 1188-1189). 
Plaintiff Maynarich contended before the Utah Court of 
Appeals, and put on evidence before the trial court, that she was 
a "business visitor" for purposes of analyzing premise liability. 
Defendant Bovier claimed Maynarich was a "licensee" and claims to 
have put on evidence to support such a factual conclusion by the 
jury. 
Plaintiff Maynarich appealed the directed verdict of the 
trial court with the appeal eventually being briefed to and decided 
by, the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Plaintiff Maynarich properly identified the standard of 
review for the Court of Appeals of the trial court's granting the 
motion for a directed verdict. Appellant's Brief P. 7 et.seq. 
However, rather than following that standard of review, and without 
even mentioning the standard of review, the Court of Appeals issued 
a unanimous decision by memorandum decision not for official 
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publication. When analyzed, the very requirements of the standard 
of review of the trial court's granting a motion for directed 
verdict, that being that the Court of Appeals consider the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the party against whom the directed 
verdict was granted, the Court of Appeals went on to make factual 
findings about disputed facts at trial and based the balance of 
its' memorandum decision on those factual conclusions reached. 
The second paragraph of the amended memorandum decision 
concludes that issues concerning the existence of a duty, in a 
negligence action, are questions of law to be determined by the 
court. The third paragraph of the amended memorandum decision 
states generally accepted Utah law that a property owner's duty to 
a person injured on the property is determined by the status of the 
person on the property. Thereafter, the Utah Court of Appeals 
cited three cases including Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irr. Co., 813 
P.2d 1169 (Utah, 1991), Whipple v. American Fork Irr. Co., 910 P.2d 
1218 (Utah, 1996) and English v. Kienke, 848 P. 2d 153 (Utah, 1993) 
as support for general legal conclusion of the third paragraph. 
Next, the Utah Court of Appeals specifically recognizes 
at the end of paragraph three that there was a factual dispute 
between the parties as to conclusions they would draw as to the 
status of Maynarich on Bovier's property. 
As such, this case is determined by 
Maynarich's status on the land. Maynarich 
contends she is a business invitee; however, 
Bovier contends Maynarich is a licensee." 
Presumably, the Utah Court of Appeals assumed that given that the 
existence of a duty is a question of law the Court of Appeals could 
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review the evidence before the trial court and reach its own 
conclusion as to Maynarichfs status on Bovier's property. The 
fifth paragraph of the amended memorandum decision indicates: 
We conclude Maynarich's actions do not reach 
the level of a business visitor. Maynarich 
did not have business dealings with Bovier or 
Dunlap, although Maynarichfs offer to acquire 
a wet/dry vacuum to assist Dunlap's clean-up 
efforts may have had some advantage to Bovier, 
this offer is much more akin to a volunteer to 
help than to a business advantage for Bovier. 
In making this factual determination, the Utah Court of 
Appeals completely overlooked the standard of review for the 
directed verdict by the trial court. The Utah Court of Appeals was 
to have considered the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Maynarich and resolved controverted facts in her favor based on the 
numerous Utah cases which have construed and interpreted the 
Appellate standard of review for Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
50(a) governing directed verdicts. 
The Utah Court of Appeals concluded that Maynarich's 
entry onto the property was in the status of a social guest and 
accordingly a "licensee" and as support thereof cited to the 
Restatement Second of Torts Section 332, comment b. The Utah Court 
of Appeals selected a portion of comment b which included the 
following: 
. . . a volunteer helper who comes upon land 
to aid in getting a truck out of a mud hole, 
or in putting out a fire, without being asked 
to do so, is a licensee but not an invitee. 
Amended Memorandum Decision paragraph 4 (emphasis added). However, 
based on the trial testimony, which was amply referenced to the 
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Court of Appeals, plaintiff Maynarich was not a volunteer without 
having been asked to do so. Defendant Dunlap testified before the 
trial court clearly that plaintiff Maynarich was invited onto the 
premises with the hopes of being able to help with the mud filled 
basement. 
Once the Court of Appeals made the factual determination 
that plaintiff Maynarich constituted a "licensee", the Court of 
Appeals went on to conclude that under the facts of the case there 
would be no duty from land owner Bovier to visitor Maynarich and 
that in any event, mud upon which plaintiff Maynarich slipped and 
fell was an open and obvious danger. 
The Court of Appeals ignored the "Good Samaritan" 
arguments advanced on behalf of Visitor Maynarich claiming the 
arguments to be without merit. See footnote 3 Amended Memorandum 
Decision, last sentence. 
ARGUMENT 
A. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS PAIL TO 
FOLLOW THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF 
REVIEW FOLLOWING THE TRIAL GRANTING 
A MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT? 
The standard of review for the Court of Appeals1 
consideration of the directed verdict by Judge Halladay was 
expressly stated to the Court of Appeals in the Appellant's Brief 
at page 7. As cited to the Utah Court of Appeals, this Court in 
Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 728-729 (Utah, 1983), with citations 
omitted, indicated: 
In directing a verdict the trial court may not 
weigh the evidence. (Citations omitted). 
Rather the court must consider the evidence in 
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the light most favorable to the party against 
whom the motion is directed and resolve 
controverted facts in his favor. (Citations 
omitted). If the evidence and its inferences 
would cause a reasonable man to arrive at 
different conclusions as to whether the 
essential facts were not proven then the 
question is one for fact for the jury. 
In that the Court of Appeals failed to apply this standard of 
review in reaching its Memorandum Decision, then clearly, the 
requirement of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 46(a)(3) 
governing considerations for granting a writ of certiorari is 
satisfied here. The Memorandum Decision has departed so far from 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings given the failure 
of the Court of Appeals to follow the standard of review that this 
Court should exercise its power of supervision and review the 
matter accordingly. 
The Utah Court of Appeals departed from the standard of 
review when it began to analyze and weigh evidence supporting, or 
contradicting Plaintiff Maynarichfs assertion that there was 
evidence to support a conclusion that she may have been a "business 
visitor" for purposes of applying premise liability law. Given the 
disputed nature of the facts supporting a potential jury 
conclusion of a "business visitor" as compared to a "licensee" it is 
apparent that the Court of Appeals1 decision should have analyzed 
"business visitor" status. 
Initially, the Court of Appeals relied upon Utah cases, 
with respect to the question of category of the visitor, in which 
the category of the visitor to the property was not questioned. 
Two of the cases involved trespassers, admitted to by parties to 
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the appeals, and the third case involved a business visitor, again 
agreed to between the parties. These cases do not support the 
Court's conclusion that it could decide the question of the status 
of visitor Maynarich on defendant Bovier's property at the 
Appellate Court level. To the contrary, as was argued to the Court 
of Appeals in the Petition for Rehearing, it is black letter law 
that the status of a person entering property is a question that is 
reserved for the jury. This Court in Rogalski v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 282 P.2d 304 (Utah, 1955) concluded that with 
respect to status of a visitor to property the type of the 
invitation and consequently the status of the visitor to the 
property ". . . has been held to be a question of fact for the 
jury to decide, citations omitted. In other words, it is for the 
jury to determine whether a person in plaintiff's position would 
believe under the circumstances that the occupier of the property 
desired to enter into that portion of the property." Rogalski at 
306. More recently this Court again emphasized that the 
categorization of a visitor to property is a question that is to be 
reserved for the jury in Gourdin By and Through Close v. SECRA, 845 
P.2d 242 (Utah, 1992) this Court specifically concluded that a jury 
question is presented. 
Of course, the jury is not restricted to those 
two alternatives. SECRA contends that if 
Gourdin was not an employee, then he must have 
been a trespasser, to whom it owed no duty. 
Consequently, it argues any error resulting 
from the directed verdict was harmless. 
However, categorizing Gourdin as a trespasser 
is only one of the several possible 
conclusions the jury might have reached. 
Because those conclusions would have reached 
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divergent outcomes, the directed verdict could 
not possibly have constituted a harmless 
error.(emphasis added) 
Numerous other jurisdictions, which continue to recognize 
the common law categories for visitors to property, have reached 
the same conclusion that this Court has reached. Years ago, the 
California Court of Appeals specifically addressed the very 
question in Speece v. Browne, 40 Cal.Rpt. 384, 40 Cal.Rpt. 384, 387 
(Cal. App., 1964) . 
Whether one is a licensee or an invitee is 
ordinarily a question of fact. (Citations 
omitted). Accordingly, the issue before us is 
whether there is evidence from which the jury 
could have found plaintiff to be an invitee. 
Speece at 386. The Speece case has been followed many times by 
other California courts. A more recent Idaho Supreme Court case 
reached the same conclusion. See Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 371 
P.2d 814 (Idaho, 1994). 
With it being relatively clear that the question of the 
status of the person on the property is a question reserved for the 
jury, the Court of Appeals' decision in this matter requires review 
because (1) the Court of Appeals substituted its judgment for a 
factual finding to have been made by the jury in this matter, but 
more importantly (2) the Court of Appeals failed to apply the 
standard of review and resolve controverted fact in favor of 
Visitor Maynarich. In order to conduct a proper analysis the Court 
of Appeals would have had to have concluded Visitor Maynarich was 
a "business visitor". 
B. DID THE COURT OP APPEALS IMPROPERLY 
WEIGH EVIDENCE PRESENTED BEFORE THE 
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TRIAL COURT TO RESOLVE A FACTUAL 
DISPUTE AGAINST THE PARTY WHO THE 
TRIAL COURT DIRECTED THE VERDICT 
AGAINST? 
Just as with question A, presented above, if the Court of 
Appeals weighed evidence to reach a factual determination which 
should have been made by the jury as to the status of visitor 
Maynarich to Bovier's property then the decision of the Court of 
Appeals has departed so far from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings that the Supreme Court's power of supervision 
is again invoked pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 46(a)(3). The amended Memorandum Decision of the Court of 
Appeals specifically references Section 322 of the Restatement 
Second of Torts, comment b. Reference to this Restatement Second 
of Torts section is contained in paragraph 4 of the Amended 
Memorandum Decision. The quotation used from comment b was taken 
from the second paragraph, which in its entirety provides as 
follows: 
Mere permission, as distinguished from 
invitation, is sufficient to make the visitor 
a licensee as stated in § 330; but it does not 
make him an invitee, even where his purpose in 
entering concerns the business of the 
possessor. Thus a volunteer helper who comes 
upon land to aid in getting a truck out of a 
mud hole or putting out a fire, without being 
asked to do so, is a licensee but not an 
invitee. Likewise a canvasing salesman 
calling at a private home in the hope of 
selling magazines is not an invitee, until he 
is invited into the house to discuss the 
matter, or the possessor otherwise encourages 
his interest for that purpose. 
The Court of Appeals1 reference to the second paragraph from the 
Restatement comment is clearly taken out of context. The 
Restatement comment was distinguishing between permission and 
invitation for purposes of determining business visitor status. 
The example used by the Court of Appeals in its decision in 
comparing the actions of visitor Maynarich coming onto the property 
to inspect to determine if a wet/dry vacuum available to her would 
be effective in cleaning up the muddy mess, at the express 
invitation of tenant Dunlap clearly does not fall within the 
portion of comment b of Restatement Second of Tort section 332. 
Because visitor Maynarich was specifically invited to come onto the 
property, the reference to a volunteer helper to come onto property 
without being invited to do so is entirely misplaced. 
The only way for the Court of Appeals to have accurately 
relied on the portion of Restatement Second of Torts Section 3 32 
comment b could have been for the Court of Appeals to weigh the 
evidence before the trial court and reach a conclusion that Visitor 
Maynarich was not invited onto the property, rather she came of her 
own accord. Such weighing of the evidence was clearly improper 
based on the standard of review. Proper application of the 
standard of review would have required the opposite conclusion by 
the Court of Appeals, that is the disputed facts be resolved in 
favor of the party against whom the directed verdict was entered, 
that being Visitor Maynarich. To conduct an adequate analysis, the 
Court of Appeals must have concluded that Visitor Maynarich was a 
"business visitor" rather than a "licensee". 
The eventual outcome of the decision would certainly have 
been effected had the Court of Appeals analyzed "duty" assuming 
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Visitor Maynarich was a "business visitor". Based on law which has 
existed in Utah since 1955 decided by this Court in the case of 
Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 282 P.2d 304 (Utah, 1955), 
The duty owed by an owner of land to a 
business visitor is to inspect and maintain 
his premises in a reasonably safe condition or 
to warn the visitor of any dangerous condition 
existing thereon. Restatement of Torts § 343. 
Rogalski at 307. The final paragraph of the decision by the Utah 
Court of Appeals clearly did not apply the duty owed to "business 
visitors" under Utah law. To the contrary, the Utah Court of 
Appeals apparently resorted to an "open and obvious danger" analysis 
to bolster its conclusion that there was no duty potentially owed 
from defendant Bovier to visitor Maynarich. The Court of Appeals 
Decision suggested: 
In this case, Bovier did not have a duty to 
warn Maynarich of the mud covering the 
driveway or to make the condition safe before 
she entered the property. Maynarich testified 
that she was aware of the mud on the driveway 
before she entered Bovier's property. Thus, 
although Bovier's modifications may have 
contributed to a buildup of mud on the 
driveway, the mud on the driveway was not a 
latent condition. Rather, the neighborhood as 
a whole was covered with debris and mud after 
the rain fall, and the mud on the driveway was 
readily apparent. 
The Utah Court of Appeals1 comments in its decision are ironic 
considering that it was the Utah Court of Appeals that decided 
Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 
789 P.2d 33, (Utah, 1990). In Donahue the Utah Court of Appeals 
specifically abrogated the common law defense of "open and obvious 
dangers" in comparative fault cases. Is the Utah Court of Appeals 
18 
now overturning its decision in Donahue and applying an "open and 
obvious danger" analysis to support its decision in this case? The 
only other interpretation that can be placed on the Utah Court of 
Appeals1 decision, last paragraph, is that it was ruling as a 
matter of law that Visitor Maynarich's comparative fault must have 
exceeded that of defendant Bovier. Such a conclusion by the Utah 
Court of Appeals would once again be invading the factual 
determinations reserved for the trier of fact, in this matter the 
jury which was empaneled prior to the trial court granting its 
motion for a directed verdict. 
C. DID THE COURT OP APPEALS PAIL TO 
PROPERLY ADDRESS THE APPLICABILITY 
OP "OFFENSIVE" USE OF THE UTAH GOOD 
SAMARITAN ACT, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 
78-11-22 RELATING TO POTENTIAL 
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE OF A "GOOD 
SAMARITAN" IN CAUSING HER OWN 
INJURIES. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in its Amended Memorandum 
Decision essentially ignored Visitor Maynarich's arguments 
surrounding "offensive" use of the Utah Good Samaritan Act. See 
Amended Memorandum Decision footnote 3, last sentence. Petitioners 
are not aware of any decision by this Court as to the applicability 
or use of the Utah Good Samaritan Act contained at Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-11-22. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 46 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure (a) (4) , based on its refusal to 
address this issue in this case the Utah Court of Appeals decided 
an important question of State law which is not been, but should be 
settled by the Supreme Court. 
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The facts before the trial court in this matter, based on 
the argument of Visitor Maynarich, should have resulted in the 
trial court instructing the jury as to applicability of the Utah 
Good Samaritan Act. Presentation of such a jury instruction would 
have been based upon the potential for the jury concluding that 
Visitor Maynarich was acting as a "Good Samaritan" under the terms 
and conditions of the statute. Had the jury reached such a 
conclusion, based on the plain language of the statute, then 
Visitor Maynarich's comparative fault would have only been 
applicable if the comparative fault amount to "gross negligence". 
Because Visitor Maynarich believes she was a Good Samaritan or 
volunteer and that the protections of the statute apply to her, 
essentially the burden of proof would have shifted to defendant 
Bovier to show that Visitor Maynarich's comparative fault reached 
the level of gross negligence as is required under the statutes. 
This matter presents the opportunity for the Utah Supreme 
Court to address squarely the issue of whether "offensive" use of 
the Utah Good Samaritan Act is viable in Utah. Indeed, by granting 
this Writ of Certiorari the Court would have the opportunity to set 
some parameters and guidelines for use of the Utah Good Samaritan 
Act, as there have not, according to petitioner's knowledge, been 
a Utah Supreme Court decision covering applicability of Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-11-22. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all the above reasons, Petitioners request that the 
Supreme Court grant certiorari for review of the Utah Court of 
Appeals decision in this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of January, 1997. 
RICHARDSON, PACKARD & LAMBERT 
/ • ' • > / ( -
Fodd ^. Richardson, "PTC?"*^* 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
Barbara Maynarich 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Plaintiff/Appellantfs Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, were mailed, first class, postage prepaid, on this the 
10th day of January, 1997, to: 
Barbara Maw 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Bovier 
185 So. State Street, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
I further certify that on this day that an original and 
nine (9) copies of this Petition for Writ of Certiorari were 
delivered to the clerk of the Supreme Coirrt of Utah Court. 
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Case No. 360246-CA v 
Albert Bovier and Stephanie 
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(Not For Official Publication) 
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(November 21, 1336) 
Seventh District, Price Department 
The Honorable Bruce K. Halliday 
Attorneys: Todd S. Richardson, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Barbara L. Maw, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Jackson. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Appellant Barbara Maynarich appeals a directed verdict 
entered in favor of Albert Bovier determining that Bovier, the 
owner/landlord of residential property on which Maynarich was 
injured, was not liable for her injury. We affirm.1 
In a negligence case, "a plaintiff must establish four 
essential elements: (1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a 
duty, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the 
breach of duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, 
and (4) that the plaintiff in fact suffered injuries or damages." 
Hunsaker v. State. 870 P.2d 833, 837 (Utah 1333). However, 
"resolution of the issue of duty is dispositive of . . . 
negligence claims," and "whether a duty exists is a question of 
law to be determined by the court." Id. 
Utah courts have often recognized "a property owner's duty 
to a person injured on his [or her] property is determined by 
that person's status on that property, an 'invitee,' or a 
1. Our ruling today also disposes of appellant's motion for 
summary reversal. 
'licensee,• or a 'trespasser.'" Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Trr. 
fifii./ 813 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah 1991); accgrfl Whipple v. American 
Fork Irr. Co.f 910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996); see also English v. 
Kienker 848 P.2d 153, 155 n.l (Utah 1993). As such, this case is 
determined by Maynarich's status on the land. Maynarich contends 
she is a business invitee; however, Bovier contends Maynarich is 
a licensee. 
The Restatement Second of Torts defines a business invitee 
as "a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a 
purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings 
with the possessor of land," Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 
(1964), and a licensee as "a person who is privileged to enter or 
remain on land only by virtue of the possessor's consent," id. 
§ 33 0. The Restatement notes "a social guest may be cordially 
invited, and strongly urged to come, but he [or she] is not an 
invitee.ff Id. § 3 32 cmt. a. Further, the Restatement 
recognizes, for example, "a volunteer helper who comes upon land 
to aid in getting a truck out of a mudhole, or in putting out a 
fire, without being asked to do so, is a licensee, but not an 
invitee." Id. § 332 cmt. b. 
We conclude Maynarich's actions do not reach the level of a 
business visitor. Maynarich did not have business dealings with 
Bovier or Dunlap. Although Maynarich's offer to acquire a wet-
dry vacuum to assist Dunlap's cleanup efforts may have had some 
advantage to Bovier, this offer is much more akin to a volunteer 
to help than to a business advantage for Bovier. 
Utah courts have defined an owner's duty to licensees. 
Although [the owner] has a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to avoid injury to such 
licensees, he generally has no duty to 
inspect his land to discover possible 
dangers, or to correct natural conditions on 
his land to guard against dangers to such 
licensees; and this is particularly true 
where the facts concerning any possible 
danger are just as apparent to the third 
party as to the landowner. 
Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 478 P.2d 496, 498-99 
(Utah 1970). 
In this case, Bovier did not have a duty to warn Maynarich 
of the mud covering the driveway or make the condition safe 
before she entered the property. Maynarich testified that she 
was aware of the mud on the driveway before she entered Bovier's 
property. Thus, although Bovier's modifications may have 
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contributed to a buildup of mud on the driveway, the mud on the 
driveway was not a latent condition. Rather, the neighborhood as 
a whole was covered with debris and mud after the rainfall, and 
the mud on the driveway was readily apparent. Moreover, under 
Stevens, Bovier did not have a duty to correct natural conditions 
on his land which would pose a danger, especially when that 
danger is apparent. We conclude the trial court properly 
determined that Bovier did not owe a duty to Bovier and therefore 
is not liable for her injury.2 We therefore affirm. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
3. Maynarich also contends the trial court improperly awarded 
Bovier deposition costs under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. We will not disturb the trial court's determination 
of costs "unless it is so unreasonable as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion." Lloyd's Unltd. v. Nature's Way. 753 P.2d 
507, 512 (Utah App. 1988). Because no such abuse occurred in 
this case, we conclude Maynarich's argument is without merit. We 
also find the remaining issues raised in Maynarich's brief to be 
without merit and therefore decline to address them. See State 
v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989). 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
Appellant Barbara Maynarich appeals a directed verdict 
entered in favor of Albert Bovier determining that Bovier, the 
owner/landlord of residential property on which Maynarich was 
injured, was not liable for her injury. We affirm.2 
In a negligence case, "a plaintiff must establish four 
essential elements: (1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a 
duty, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the 
breach of duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, 
and (4) that the plaintiff in fact suffered injuries or damages." 
Hunsaker v. State. 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993). However, 
"resolution of the issue of duty is dispositive of . . . 
negligence claims," and "whether a duty exists is a question of 
law to be determined by the court." Id. 
1. This Amended Memorandum Decision replaces the Memorandum 
Decision in Case No. 960246-CA issued on November 21, 1996. 
2. Our ruling today also disposes of appellant's motion for 
summary reversal. 
Utah courts have often recognized "a property owner's duty 
to a person injured >n his [or her] property is determined by 
that person's status on that property, an 'invitee,' or a 
'licensee,' or a 'trespasser.'" Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow irr. 
QQ^, 813 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah 1991); accord Whipple v. American 
For'"* Irr, CO. , 910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996); see also English v. 
Kienke. 848 P.2d 153, 155 n.l (Utah 1993). As such, this case is 
determined by Maynarich's status on the land. Maynarich contends 
she is a business invitee; however, Bovier contends Maynarich is 
a licensee. 
The Restatement Second of Torts defines a business invitee 
as "a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a 
purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings 
with the possessor of land," Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 
(1964), and a lijensee as "a person who is privileged to enter or 
remain on land only by virtue of the possessor's consent," id. 
§ 330. The Restatement notes "a social guest may be cordially 
invited, and strongly urged to come, but he [or she] is not an 
i.ivitee." Id. ' 3 32 cmt. a. Further, the Restatement 
recognizes, for example, "a volunteer helper who comes upon land 
to aid in getting a truck out of a mudhole, or in putting out a 
fire, without being asked to do so, is a licensee, but not an 
invitee." Id. § 332 cmt. b. 
We conclude Maynarich's actions do not reach the level of a 
business visitor. Maynarich did not have business dealings winh 
Bovier or Dunlap. Although Maynarich's offer to acquire a wet-
dry vacuum to assist ^-inlap's cleanup efforts may have had some 
advantage to Bovier, t.iis offer is much more akin to a volunteer 
to help than to a business advantage for Bovier. 
Utah courts have defined an owner's duty to licensees. 
Although [the owner] has a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to avoid injury to such 
licensees, he generally has no duty to 
inspect his land to discover possible 
dangers, or to correct natural conditions on 
his land to guard against dangers to such 
licensees; and this is particularly true 
where the facts concerning any possible 
danger are just as apparent to th. -hird 
party as to the landowner. 
Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 478 P.2d 496, 498-99 
(Utah 1970). 
In this case, Bovier did not have a duty to warn Maynarich 
of the mud covering the driveway or make the condition safe 
960246-CA 2 
before she entered the property. Maynarich testified that she 
was aware of the mud on the driveway before she entered Bovier's 
property. Thus, although Bovier's modifications may have 
contributed to a buildup of mud on the driveway, the mud on the 
driveway was not a latent condition. Rather, the neighborhood as 
a whole was covered with debris and mud after the rainfall, and 
the mud on the driveway was readily apparent. Moreover, under 
Stevens, Bovier did not have a duty to correct natural conditions 
on his land which would pose a danger, especially when that 
danger is apparent. We conclude the trial court properly 
determined that Bovier did not owe a duty to Maynarich and 
therefore is not liable for her injury.3 We therefore affirm. 
lith M. Billings, Judged 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
&&~&\ 
Nbrman H. JacksrtSfT,Judge 
3. Maynarich also contends the trial court improperly awarded 
Bovier deposition costs under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. We will not disturb the trial court's determination 
of costs "unless it is so unreasonable as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion." Lloyd's Unltd. v. Nature's Way, 753 P.2d 
507, 512 (Utah App. 1988). Because no such abuse occurred in 
this case, we conclude Maynarich's argument is without merit. We 
also find the remaining issues raised in Maynarich's brief to be 
without merit and therefore decline to address them. See State 
v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989). 
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ORDER 
Case No. 960246-CA 
This matter is before the court upon appellant's petition 
for rehearing, filed December 5, 1996. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is 
denied. 
Dated this I \^ day of December, 1996. 
FOR THE COURT: 
%&&&^ 
Norman H. Jackson^uudge 
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